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Abstract: This article studies the Kennedy administration’s labor market policies as 
a case of lesson drawing during a transnational moment in the early 1960s. With the 
election of Kennedy, leaders in the labor movement rose to positions of policymaking 
influence, in the process reimagining the United States’ political and economic land-
scape. This spirit of reform led to the embrace of Sweden’s solidarity wage policy and 
Rehn-Meidner model as lessons on how to balance full employment, economic growth, 
and a powerful labor movement. However, Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg and 
Walter Reuther of the United Automobile Workers found implementing Swedish poli-
cies to be more difficult than they expected, even with the support of a sitting presi-
dent. Their experiences demonstrate the possibility for policy diffusion from small 
states to the United States over a short period, as well as its risks and limitations.
Keywords: lesson drawing, Rehn-Meidner, Walter Reuther, Swedish model, labor 
movement
Introduction
On 20 December 1962, Walter Reuther, the enterprising president of the 
powerful United Automobile Workers union (UAW), received a note from 
Nat Weinberg, his trusted intellectual advisor and head of the UAW’s Spe-
cial Projects Department, regarding a brewing conflict abroad. Having re-
ceived troubling news from Sweden, where management at the new IBM 
factory was resisting Swedish unionization efforts, Weinberg begged his 
boss to intercede with Thomas Watson, Jr., the American CEO of IBM, 
about allowing the plant to be unionized. Surely, Weinberg reasoned, “con-
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sidering the responsible attitudes of the Swedish trade union movement,” 
Watson could have no grounds to resist.1
Weinberg’s letter to Reuther was just one of the many circulating 
amongst US labor leaders during the 1960s that shared images of the Scan-
dinavian labor movement as a rational, powerful institution and of Nordic 
industrial policy as modern, effective, and beneficial. Yet, such widespread 
dissemination of a single positive outlook on Scandinavia begs important 
questions. From where did “labor-liberals,” a combination of progressive 
Democrats and union officials, derive such a potent image of Swedish labor 
peace? And, more importantly, why would Americans like Weinberg and 
Reuther care about defending its existence?
These questions structure my examination of a transnational moment in 
the early 1960s when Scandinavian industrial policy became an influential 
model for American labor relations. Labor historians have traditionally at-
tempted to understand the motivations of labor-liberals through international 
comparison, alternatively linking the goals of figures like Walter Reuther and 
Arthur Goldberg with Germany, France, and Sweden.2 These comparisons 
can obscure the actual desires of these leaders, who jointly looked towards 
Scandinavian policy to define and defend their interests, albeit in ways that 
occasionally proved contradictory with both the original Scandinavian meth-
ods and the goals of other labor-liberals. Therefore, instead of contrasting na-
tional systems, I track the numerous interactions and intersections of Ameri-
can and Scandinavian labor to explore how and why actors associated with 
the Kennedy administration tried to import Scandinavian policy across the 
Atlantic. As a form of lesson drawing, these attempts also gave a space for 
Nordic leaders to craft an image of their homelands for American audiences, 
determining which qualities best represented their experiences and ensuring 
that this “Scandinavian image” was in fact a “Swedish image.” By etching 
the contours of American interest in Scandinavian policy, I further gauge its 
impact in the United States’ decision-making and determine the causes for 
the unraveling of this transnational moment. In both its hopeful beginnings 
and disappointing endings, this transnational moment reveals a potential, and 
ultimately rejected, turning point in American history, a road not taken.
1 Nat Weinberg to Walter Reuther, 20 December 1962, UAW Research Department: Special Projects Collec-
tion, Box 128, Folder 3, Reuther.
2 Boyle, UAW, 149; Stebenne, Arthur J. Goldberg, 152–53; Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther, 337–38; Lichten-
stein, State of the Union, 134.
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This paper begins by reviewing previous scholarship on the transnation-
al circulation of images of Scandinavia and arguing the significance of a 
lesson drawing perspective. Next, I compare industrial policy in the USA 
and Scandinavia in 1960, thus situating American interest in Scandinavia. 
Following this, I examine two areas where Americans drew lessons from 
Scandinavia: collective bargaining and active labor market policy. Then I 
place these findings in the context of transnational movements in the early 
1960s, including exploring why Sweden dominated American attention and 
the ultimate impact of Scandinavian lessons. Finally, I discuss the end of 
this transnational moment and its meanings.
Images and Lessons from Scandinavia
Despite discrepancies in size, material resources, and global reach, the at-
traction of Scandinavian policy in the US has inspired an extensive body 
of historical work examining a process of circulation, in which self-images 
and foreign images of the Scandinavian countries spread, “in a mutually 
reinforcing way.”3 This mechanism turns Scandinavia into “a mediated re-
gion” of “discursively maintained concepts,”4 the temporal nature of which 
scholars have shown to great effect.5 As is implied by “mediation,” intel-
lectual or media actors produce these images and shape them with their own 
“strongly held convictions and ideals.”6 Such representations attract both 
producers and consumers because of their viability as visions of moder-
nity, triangulating local developments through the lens of potential futures 
abroad.7
Using this framework of mediation, historians have raised questions 
about why Scandinavian images circulate. A common explanation rests 
on the actions of the Scandinavian states themselves, who deployed posi-
3 Andersson and Hilson, “Images of Sweden,” 222.
4 Harvard and Stadius, “Communicative Perspective,” 1–2.
5 As an example, see, Marklund, “The Social Laboratory.”
6 Harvard and Stadius, “Communicative Perspective,” 6.
7 Andersson, “Nordic Nostalgia,” 234; Musiał, Tracing Roots.”plainCitation”:”Andersson, “Nordic No-
stalgia and Nordic Light,” 234; Musiał, Tracing Roots of the Scandinavian Model.”},”citationItems”
:[{”id”:1291,”uris”:[”http://zotero.org/users/1192408/items/X852WXHE”],”uri”:[”http://zotero.org/
users/1192408/items/X852WXHE”],”itemData”:{”id”:1291,”type”:”article-journal”,”title”:”Nordic 
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tive representations of their systems as a means of public diplomacy and 
branding.8 Less frequent are studies of the American context for such cir-
culations, despite recognition that the US’s “specific domestic questions” 
determined the extent and nature of image proliferation.9 Very rarely have 
historians taken the next step and analyzed how Scandinavia served as a 
practical model for American emulation, perhaps because some scholars 
have questioned its worth as a subject of academic attention.10
To undertake such a study, it is therefore necessary to appropriate a frame-
work for understanding the mechanism by which one nation transfers policy 
from another. Lesson drawing theory satisfies this need. Unlike coercive or 
convergence processes, lesson drawing is a voluntary process, where actors 
seek answers from abroad, often with a bounded rationality that accounts for 
structural and circumstantial constraints. The concept of rationality best fits 
with the intent of actors in the United States to draw upon the policies from 
the smaller Scandinavian states. According to Richard Rose, policymakers 
are the primary performers of lesson drawing. Facing discontentment with 
the status quo at home, politicians and other decision makers undertake a 
“problem-oriented search” abroad.11 Although lessons are generally drawn 
from political systems believed to have been particularly successful in deal-
ing with an issue—in other words, a search for best practice—other factors 
can enhance the appeal of a foreign state: similarities in resources, preexist-
ing interdependence, and ideological compatibility. Rose finds the last as-
pect particularly important, as, “There is little point in social democratic 
policymakers looking for lessons from a country governed by adherents of 
free enterprise, for even if programme means are found to be transferable, 
programme goals may be unacceptable.”12
International similarities between states are not the only factors that fa-
cilitate (and potentially hinder) lesson drawing. A major condition for suc-
cessful lesson drawing is the existence of “green field” sites: policy areas 
8 Marklund, “A Swedish Norden”; Marklund and Petersen, “Return to Sender”; Glover, National Relations; 
Kastrup, Med Sverige.
9 Stadius, “Happy Countries,” 242; Logue, “The Swedish Model,” 166–67.
10 Houe and Rossel, Images of America, ix. The most studied attempt to “import” Scandinavian political 
products is the 1936 Inquiry on Cooperative Enterprise, of which Piebe Teeboom’s unpublished PhD thesis 
gives the best account. Teeboom, “Searching.”
11 Rose, Learning, 5.
12 Rose, “Ten Steps,” 8, 18.12,23]]}},”locator”:”8, 18”}],”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-lan-
guage/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”} 
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that have been largely unregulated or overlooked. Therefore, a lesson drawn 
from abroad would be building new institutions without having to first de-
molish embedded interests. On the other hand, “brown field” sites resist les-
son drawing, as preexisting policies and public agencies impede its imple-
mentation.13 Successful lessons are studied, turned into a “cause-and-effect 
model,” assigned symbolic value, and eventually become part of the domes-
tic agenda.14 Unsuccessful lessons are ditched during this process.
In providing a defined procedure by which policymakers appropriate les-
sons from abroad, Rose offers a framework and a language against which to 
set labor-liberals’ attempts to “learn” from Scandinavia. As Rose predicts, 
this American attention to Scandinavian policy took place amongst domes-
tic discontentment with industrial policy and economic outlooks. The next 
section explores the diverging circumstances for labor unions in Scandina-
via and the United States in 1960.
Labor Policy in the 1960s
Even before the decade known in Sweden as “the golden years,”15 optimism 
was high in Scandinavia. Improved productivity, wages, and trade balance 
reflected virtually continuous economic expansion since the Second World 
War and resulted in higher GDPs, both gross and relative, as well as better 
standards of living.16 From the cellar of Western democracies at the begin-
ning of the 1950s, Scandinavia’s economies had risen to the top, aided by 
the prioritization of neo-corporatist industrial policy.17 A social democratic 
desire for social engineering made manifest, Scandinavian economic policy 
attempted to balance full employment and wage equality with the pres-
sures of inflation, rather than following a prototypical Keynesian program 
of counter-cyclical, “stop-go measures.”18 Instead, the Scandinavian states 
practiced centralized economic steering, called the Rehn-Meidner model 
in Sweden, which promoted an active labor market policy through public 
13 Rose, “Ten Steps,” 16.12,23]]}},”locator”:”16”}],”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-language/
schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”} 
14 Rose, Lesson-Drawing, 13–14; Rose, Learning, 23.
15 Östberg and Andersson, Sveriges historia, 25ff.
16 Einhorn and Logue, “Can Welfare States,” 9; OECD, “OECD.Stat.”
17 Rasmussen and Rüdiger, Danmarks Historie, 147; Storing, Norwegian Democracy, 205; Hilson, Nordic 
Model, 66.
18 Hilson, Nordic Model, 69.
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spending on vocational training and retraining, as well as relocation pro-
grams. In Sweden, this latter goal produced a system of worker relocation 
to labor-hungry industrial areas, primarily in the country’s southern region 
(earing it the nickname “All Must go South” [Alla Måste Söderut]), while 
in Norway and Denmark, subsidies and other incentives moved capital to 
labor-surplus regions so as to maintain their cultural independence and dis-
tinctiveness [Danish: Egnsudvikling].19 This supply-side focus extended 
into a Swedish investment reserve fund aimed at directing private invest-
ment and augmenting spending in the event of an economic downturn.20 
In Sweden, many of these policies were managed or directed by the La-
bor Market Board [Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS], an entity principled 
on “modern state interventionism,” with a tripartite leadership and a staff 
primarily recruited from labor.21
The success of the Rehn-Meidner model depended on a solidarity wage 
policy that demanded restraint from both trade unions and business interests 
in their wage and price setting. This was accomplished under a cooperative 
framework of centralized collective bargaining, known in Sweden as the 
“Spirit of Saltsjöbaden.” Negotiations between labor and management took 
place without state arbitration, although government officials maintained 
relations and dialogue with both sides. To bolster these lines of communi-
cation, industrial leaders often gathered at the prime minister’s countryside 
residence in Harpsund, giving the policy its name “Harpsunddemokratin” 
(Harpsund democracy). Throughout Scandinavia, with its high trade union 
density (72.1 percent in Sweden in 1960), labor proved powerful allies of 
the ruling Social Democrats.22 In exchange for expanded social programs 
and spending to benefit workers, including policies offering high levels 
of income replacement for the temporarily unemployed, the trade unions 
maintained restraint in their wage demands.23 Labor conditions in Scandi-
navia in 1960 were therefore centralized and generally peaceful, boasting 
conditions that gave private industry room to profit while nonetheless re-
specting the influence and demands of organized labor.
The trajectory for American trade unions since the war was less inspir-
19  Hilson, Nordic Model, 70; Rasmussen and Rüdiger, Danmarks Historie, 156.
20  Östberg and Andersson, Sveriges historia, 31; Rasmussen and Rüdiger, Danmarks Historie, 169.
21  Sejersted, Age of Social Democracy, 222.
22  OECD, “OECD.Stat.”
23  Einhorn and Logue, “Can Welfare States,” 9.
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ing. Despite a quick recovery from a recession in 1958 and later in 1961, 
unemployment in the US remained highest amongst OECD countries from 
1960-1964, around 5.5 percent. Comparatively, Scandinavian unemploy-
ment over the same period ranged between 1.2 percent (Sweden) and 2.2 
percent (Denmark and Norway).24 The US lacked a coherent central strate-
gy to deal with issues like automation and, for many Americans, a copacetic 
economic situation disguised structural uncertainties within the American 
economy. Such trends were worrying for labor-liberals, as were the effec-
tive attacks by conservative and business forces upon American unions 
since 1945. While the New Deal, and in particular the 1935 Wagner Act, 
had established the labor movement as participants in “a new political or-
der” with the Democratic Party, the origins of the “labor-liberal” moniker, it 
also left the unions open to attack during the conservative swing in Ameri-
can politics following World War II.25 The Taft-Hartley Act, which elimi-
nated sympathy strikes and closed shops and forced union officers to sign a 
non-Communist affidavit, effectually demilitarized the unions by weeding 
out labor’s radical edge and outlawing some of its most effective weapons.
The apathetic attitude of the Eisenhower administration to organized 
labor and the merger of the two largest employee federations in the US, 
the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO), in 1955 extinguished the last gasp of union radical-
ism. The merger also set the stage for one of the major labor rivalries of 
the mid-century, between Reuther, the social democratic president of the 
CIO and UAW, and George Meany, head of the AFL. The new umbrella 
organization commanded formidable economic power, especially as union 
density continued to increase, although the US’s 30.9 percent in 1960 still 
fell well short of Scandinavia.26 However, shifts in labor’s methods, such 
as the reliance on the ritualized strike, and goals, especially prioritizing 
contractual benefits over wider social programs, threatened to “ghettoize” 
labor’s influence in the political realm.27
Yet, the election of John F. Kennedy opened new possibilities for the 
movement. Having organized their unions behind the Massachusetts sena-
tor, labor leaders expected to assert a level of influence over the presidency 
24  Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel, “Unemployment,” 2.
25  Plotke, “The Wagner Act,” 153; Boyle, Organized Labor.
26  OECD, “OECD.Stat.”
27  Lichtenstein, State of the Union, 125-129; Dubofsky, The State & Labor, 212ff.
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unknown since Roosevelt’s 1936 reelection. Kennedy certainly seemed to 
reciprocate, appointing Arthur Goldberg his Secretary of Labor. The choice 
of Goldberg, former counsel and strategist for the CIO and United Steel-
workers of America, put a knowledgeable and cosmopolitan leader friendly 
to organized labor in charge of administering American industrial relations. 
Additionally, Kennedy selected Esther Peterson, his CIO representative in 
Washington, as Assistant Secretary of Labor and head of the Women’s Bu-
reau. The USA seemed on the brink of a new age of labor policy.
Defining the Public Interest
It was in this atmosphere of optimism and prospective gains that America’s 
labor-liberals looked to ideas from Scandinavia to reinvigorate labor’s for-
tunes. Partially, the decision to draw lessons from Scandinavia owed to 
the discreditment of other European models, such as the British system of 
decentralized shop floor activism, which lost its legitimacy amongst the 
centralized and demilitarized American labor movement.28 However, more 
important was the US’s long history of appreciation for Scandinavian in-
dustrial relations, which seemed to function with minimal friction and loss. 
Following the ravages of the Great Depression, Americans had looked to 
Scandinavia, and particularly Sweden, for “industrial democracy” in ac-
tion.29 A vision of accommodating and democratic relations enticed Ameri-
cans, especially when Marquis Childs, whose Sweden: The Middle Way had 
been a bestseller, published This Is Democracy: Collective Bargaining in 
Scandinavia in 1938.30 His description of “middle way” industrial pragma-
tism resonated with Americans. Proponents included Franklin Roosevelt, 
who, the same year as Childs’s book, placed Sweden on the agenda of a 
commission investigating collective bargaining in Great Britain. Although 
such studies were somewhat disrupted by war and subsequent reconstruc-
tion, during which Scandinavian unionists instead drew upon technical 
knowledge from the US,31 the view of Scandinavia as possessing a uniquely 
“mature” and “good” labor policy persisted.32 Indeed, in 1951, economist 
28 Tolliday and Zeitlin, “Shop Floor Bargaining,” 219–20.
29 Stadius, “Happy Countries,” 246.
30 Childs, This Is Democracy.
31 Fossat, “American Way.”
32 Lester, “Reflections,” 375; Clayton, “Collective Bargaining,” 109.
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Charles Myers predicted a convergence between US and Swedish industrial 
policy “in another ten years.” Yet Myers failed to foresee that the act of 
translating foreign ideas opened them to interpretation, and hence difficul-
ties in their enactment.33
Goldberg was therefore certainly not alone when he began studying Swe-
den’s industrial relations system early in his tenure as Secretary of Labor. 
He believed the arrangement held answers “for eliminating the problems 
that increasingly threatened the post-war social contract” between labor 
and management.34 In April 1961, the day after meeting Tage Erlander, the 
prime minister of Sweden, at a banquet in Washington D.C., Goldberg an-
nounced his intentions to visit Sweden.35 While labor unrest at home forced 
Goldberg to cancel this first visit in July 1961, several deputies, includ-
ing Esther Peterson, travelled to Sweden to study labor policy, especially 
training and retraining programs.36 Following this false start, Goldberg re-
ceived a formal invitation from Erlander to visit Sweden, which the secre-
tary accepted. On 18 September 1961, Goldberg departed Washington for 
a two-week tour of training facilities and industrial institutions throughout 
Scandinavia, Finland, and the Netherlands. The highlight was a meeting of 
government, labor, and business leaders at the prime minister’s residence in 
Harpsund. Witnessing a demonstration of Harpsund democracy, Goldberg 
read a prepared statement in Swedish, telling his audience, “We have much 
to learn from you.”37
The philosophy of “mutual respect” between employer and employee 
representatives concurred with Goldberg’s own views on the proper atmo-
sphere of industrial relations,38 which he hoped to preserve in the face of 
the “hardening of attitudes” in collective bargaining.39 The secretary was a 
product of the mid-century labor movement, which structured itself around 
centralized labor leaders representing an obedient rank-and-file, a change 
from the traditional grassroots autonomy of American locals.40 The place-
33 Myers, Industrial Relations in Sweden, 112.
34 Stebenne, Arthur J. Goldberg, 263.
35 “Goldberg Plans.”
36 Shelton, “Swedish System.”
37 Stebenne, Arthur J. Goldberg, 263.
38 “Goldberg Hails Swedes.”
39 Opotowsky, The Kennedy Government, 105.
40 Berendt, Cornfield, and Edelman, “Arthur J. Goldberg’s Legacies,” 698; Oettinger, “Collective Bargain-
ing,” 250.
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ment of bargaining responsibility within the leadership of labor internation-
als and federations fit with the “highly organized” and centralized nature of 
Scandinavian bargaining, in which confederated employee and employer 
organizations negotiated general contracts.41 As Goldberg announced at 
a press conference the day after returning to Washington, his trip to Scan-
dinavia had convinced him that the freedom of collective bargaining was 
sacred, but:
That the very best way to achieve this ultimate result is by having responsible manage-
ment and responsible labor unions discharge their common responsibility to the public, 
and that the more authority there is in employers’ organizations and in labor unions to 
function in this area, and the more acceptance there is on both sides of each other, the 
better hope that we have that their results will be compatible with the overall public 
interest.42
In emphasizing the primacy of the public interest, which would come to 
mean wage restraint amongst the unions and price control amongst the 
employers, Goldberg’s statement was not notably original. Eisenhower’s 
administration had likewise prioritized maintaining reasonable wages and 
prices in privately negotiated contracts to avoid passing costs on to the 
consumer.43 However, even whilst praising Sweden’s respect for private 
bargaining, Goldberg was about to demonstrate that he had also picked up 
another lesson from Scandinavia: the need for the state to take responsibil-
ity when labor and capital refused to act responsibly.
Despite the generally subordinate role of the state in Swedish industrial 
relations, especially with the absence of compulsory arbitration, the gov-
ernment nonetheless played an active part in overseeing the centralized 
bargaining process, meeting with economic leaders at Harpsund and pro-
viding labor mediation when necessary. The procedure demonstrated the 
government’s willingness to work with representatives of labor and busi-
ness to ensure peaceful and profitable decisions. Yet, when Goldberg tried 
to commend the system at his press conference, he was instead buffeted 
with questions about the upcoming negotiations in the steel industry. The 
strike of the steel unions in 1959 over provisions for managerial rights had 
been devastating and resulted in the weakening of the industry as a whole 
41 Clayton, “Collective Bargaining,” 98.
42 Arthur Goldberg, “Press Conference,” 2 October 1961, Folder: Set VI, II:57, Goldberg.
43 Oettinger, “Collective Bargaining,” 233.
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when American companies turned to cheaper sources of steel abroad. Now, 
Goldberg declared the necessity of “stability and settlements” and worked 
to broker a contract that froze both wages and prices, meant to reinvigorate 
steel’s international competitiveness.44 Indeed, in a report to Kennedy about 
his Swedish visit, Goldberg recommended that restraint amongst labor and 
management, imparted by an awareness of the global market, “may rapidly 
be replicated in the United States.”45 Goldberg accordingly parlayed his 
Scandinavian experiences into a policy that would have the federal gov-
ernment take an active, continuous, and direct role in defining the national 
interest in private negotiations. Goldberg would later explain that it had not 
been his initiative to insert a federal role into “any dispute with nationwide 
impact.” Instead, he recounted, “I was a Secretary of Labor for a very ac-
tivist President.”46 However, subsequent historians have noted Kennedy’s 
apparent indifference to the plans of the labor-liberals, although he was 
supportive of Goldberg in the calamity that followed.47 Rightfully then did 
Business Week declare this new policy the “Goldberg doctrine.” 48
The interventionism of Goldberg’s Labor Department held superficial 
similarities to the Harpsund democracy of Sweden, but the difference in 
responses highlights the problems with such surface appearances. Labor 
historian Melvyn Dubofsky describes how American labor, in their coali-
tion with the Democrats, was willing to accept some degree of regulation, 
much as Western European trade unions were willing to restrain themselves 
to accommodate their social democratic allies.49 But Goldberg’s proposed 
government oversight over private negotiations worried labor leaders. 
Upon hearing Goldberg announce the Kennedy administration’s intention 
to “define and assert the national interest in collective bargaining,” George 
Meany protested that the secretary was “infringing on the rights of free 
people and free society.”50 At the AFL-CIO convention in December, the 
44 Arthur Goldberg, ”Press Conference,” 2 October 1961, Folder: Set VI, II:57, Goldberg; Lichtenstein, State 
of the Union, 132, 135; Stebenne, Arthur J. Goldberg, 291.
45 Arthur Goldberg, “Draft: Secretary’s Report on Sweden,” 6 December 1961, MC 450, Folder: 1228. 
Schlesinger.
46 Quoted in Sorensen, Kennedy, 440.
47 Perlstein, Before the Storm, 34; Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther, 357. In fact, Kennedy was generally illiterate 
in most economic matters. Reeves, President Kennedy, 54, 294–95.
48 “A Leader Must Lead.”
49 Dubofsky, The State & Labor, 217, 219.
50 “Keep Hands Off.”
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audience, cautious about state authority after a decade and a half of conser-
vative attack from Washington, booed Goldberg when he brought up wage 
restraint.51 Even Walter Reuther, generally more sympathetic to corporatist 
arrangements, publicly warned the administration that unions would guard 
against losing their ability to make collective agreements.52 Very quickly, it 
became apparent that Americans viewed the lessons from Scandinavia as a 
path leading to just such a loss of control, an assumption Goldberg learned 
firsthand. The day after his press conference, two days after returning from 
Europe, Goldberg gave speeches before both employee and employer or-
ganizations describing his realization while in Scandinavia that both sides 
“must…operate with enlightened polices of cooperation in place of con-
flict, of self-interest measured and enlightened by the national interest of 
which they are a part.”53 However, as the press reported the next day, the 
secretary “got his coolest reception at both conferences on this point.”54
Freedom and Democracy in Labor Market Policy
Despite the limited and critical reception that Scandinavian lessons in col-
lective bargaining received, other avenues for lesson drawing from Scandi-
navia remained open. Most notably, Kennedy and the labor-liberals saw the 
active labor market policy of the Rehn-Meidner model as a chance to over-
haul government measures in combating unemployment. Representative of 
this new logic was the AMS, “a powerful public body with a budget to 
match.”55 The AMS administered employment programs, including services 
for training, retraining, and worker mobility. For mid-century progressives, 
such programs promised solutions to growing economic inequities and the 
long-term effects of automation on employment. Thus, in 1964, Senator 
Paul Douglas, who had passed federal legislation in 1961 and 1962 bring-
ing jobs and retraining programs to depressed areas, commissioned a Joint 
Economic Committee report on the Unemployment Programs in Sweden 
that gave a favorable view of Sweden’s “enviable record of unemployment” 
51 Dallek, An Unfinished Life, 482–83.
52 Strout, “Growth Rate.”
53 Arthur Goldberg, “Address before the NAM,” 3 October 1961, Folder: Set VI, II:57, Goldberg.
54 Townsend, “People at Work.”
55 Hilson, Nordic Model, 70.
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and success in “dampening boom conditions” and raising productivity.56 
The attraction was widespread. In February 1965, American ambassador 
to Sweden J. Graham Parsons described a “procession” of American visi-
tors to the AMS, inspired by official United States interest in employment 
services and retraining activities.57
American debates on the AMS were even more intense at the beginning 
of Kennedy’s administration, as the role of Scandinavia in the President’s 
Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Policy (PACLMP) attests. 
The creation of Goldberg, the PACLMP was intended to be a “consensual” 
body—made up of members from labor, business, and the public—that 
would investigate and make recommendations, “to promote collective bar-
gaining, industrial peace, sound wage and price policies, and higher living 
standards.”58 In its tripartite membership and desire for centralized steering, 
the PACLMP resembled the AMS, although its advisory nature meant that 
it possessed no ability to actually implement its recommendations. Still, the 
PACLMP existed as a testament to labor’s belief that the previous bonds 
of industrial power had loosened and a rewriting of multilateral decision-
making was eminent.
One member of the PACLMP particularly enthusiastic about its corporat-
ist possibilities was Walter Reuther. Reuther had seen such a setup work in 
Sweden, where he was a frequent visitor and a favorite of the Scandinavian 
media, who basked in the labor leader’s praise.59 Encompassing ambitions 
for tripartite planning stretching back to the Second World War, “Reuther-
ism,” as Reuther’s flexible vision for America became known, “encapsulat-
ed a vital strand of social democratic thought.” It linked union power with 
government authority in a corporatist arrangement “designed to reorganize 
American capitalism within a more stable and humane framework.”60
Aiding this convergence in goals between Reutherism and Swedish neo-
corporatist policy was the professional and personal relationship of Reuther 
and Arne Geijer, president of the Swedish Trade Union Organization (LO). 
Geijer regularly hosted Reuther on his trips to Scandinavia, a favor Reuther 
56 Schnitzer, “Programs,” iii, 31.
57 J. Graham Parsons to State Dept (A-516), 12 February 1965, NARA, RG59, Entry A1 1613, Box 2678, POL 
2-3 SWE.
58 Stebenne, Arthur J. Goldberg, 238; Maraniss, Once, 22.
59 Vincent P. Wilbur to State Dept (Desp. No. 399), 3 December 1959, NARA, RG84, Entry UD 2386, Box 64, 
560.1 Trade Unions.
60 Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther, 155.
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returned during Geijer’s many trips to the US. Both Geijer and Reuther were 
internationalists, believing in the possibilities of a global labor movement, 
and Reuther backed Geijer’s successful bid to become head of the Interna-
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions in 1957.61 More than allies, the 
two were personally close: planning fishing trips and vacations in Florida, 
visiting each other with families in tow, and hosting each other’s daughters 
during summers abroad. As Reuther biographer Nelson Lichtenstein sur-
mises, Geijer was, “one of his [Reuther’s] few genuinely intimate friends.”62
The allegiance between American and Swedish labor served as a catalyst 
for proposals that Geijer and other Swedish leaders appear before the PA-
CLMP to testify on the Rehn-Meidner system. The formal invitation came 
from Goldberg, who delayed inviting the Swedes until after the committee 
had defined the problems facing the US labor market,63 notwithstanding 
Reuther’s calls for a study of Sweden since the second meeting.64 On 2 
October 1962, a distinguished commission arrived in the Fish Room of 
the White House to testify on the Swedish system of industrial relations: 
Geijer; Bertil Kugelberg, director of the Swedish Employers Association; 
and Ernst Michanek, Undersecretary of Labor. Under the gaze of the mas-
sive sailfish mounted on the wall, they met with Goldberg, present despite 
recent elevation to the Supreme Court, Reuther, and a number of other no-
table American leaders.
All three guests began with prepared statements that attempted to estab-
lish the ideological compatibility between Sweden and the US. Despite a 
common focus on the benefits of cooperative industrial relationships and 
mutual recognition of labor, business, and government, the delegation em-
ployed conflicting signifiers and meanings to praise the Swedish model. 
Kugelberg leaned on the term “freedom,” meaning free enterprise, to ex-
plain how the goals of the two countries were the same. Geijer, on the other 
hand, stressed the “democratic” nature of the Swedish corporatist system, 
relating how unions had gained the right to influence economic policy. Both 
Kugelberg and Geijer placed their ideology within a Cold War context, de-
scribing their support for the preservation of “freedom” and “democracy” 
61 Carew, Walter Reuther.
62 Lichtenstein, Walter Reuther, 338.
63 Stebenne, Arthur J. Goldberg, 264.
64 “Minutes of PACLMP Meeting,” 1 May 1961, NARA, RG 220, Records of the PACLMP, Entry A1 34140, 
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against “dictatorship.” On another point they agreed: a fundamental part 
of the Swedish system was keeping government out of wage negotiations 
while maintaining contact with public representatives in other forms. As a 
government representative, Michanek was more reticent regarding the non-
interventionist approach of the state, noting the AMS’s role as a national 
mediation service. Nonetheless, Michanek, combining the signifiers of his 
two countrymen, described how the “high degree of responsibility in free-
dom” to negotiate wages without government interference was “part, as it 
were, of our democratic ideology.”65
In their statements, the Swedes seemed reluctant to comment on how 
Swedish policy might benefit the US; conversely, they were quick to point 
out places of national divergence. Instead, it was the Americans, and par-
ticularly Reuther, who explicated on the meanings of Swedish policy for 
domestic conditions. In particular, the PACLMP questioned their guests 
about employment measures like labor mobility and the investment reserve. 
Reuther’s desire to see the government take a more active role in managing 
the economy led him to probe Kugelberg about whether the AMS focused 
on broad aspects of economic planning.66 When Kugelberg subsequently 
affirmed that it did, the UAW president doubled down on this idea by de-
claring “that in the United States we have made greater progress on col-
lective bargaining issues between labor and management than we have in 
the political arena.”67 Reuther thereby mirrored Geijer’s own description 
of “democracy” by envisioning an economy with a tripartite influence in 
policymaking. The election of Kennedy had opened the possibility for such 
imagining, as had Reuther’s own convictions that, despite the “different 
historical backgrounds” of American and Swedish labor, “our basic aims 
are similar.”68
Even though the meeting with the Swedes provoked internal calls to 
study other foreign models, the PACLMP remained focused upon Sweden. 
Reuther was a driving force behind the retained interest, castigating the 
committee for not having done more with Swedish examples.69 A new del-
65 “Notes from Bertil Kugelberg’s Remarks;” “Presentation by Ernst Michanek;” “Notes from Arne Geijer’s 
Opening Remarks,” 2 October 1962, NARA, RG 220, Records of the PACLMP, Entry A1 34140, Box 13.
66 Lichtenstein, State of the Union, 134–35.
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egation of Swedes testified before the PACLMP on 25 March 1963, this 
time to specifically investigate the “various contra-cyclical policies and 
programs currently utilized in Sweden.”70 Whereas the tripartite delega-
tion was composed of venerable industrial leaders, the second delegation 
skewed younger: Curt Nicolin, head of Sweden’s largest energy concern, 
and Krister Wickman, Undersecretary of Finance. The second delegation, 
especially Nicolin, proved more willing to criticize the Rehn-Meidner mod-
el and make recommendations for the US. During the meeting, new Secre-
tary of Labor Willard Wirtz asked the inevitable question about how Swe-
den’s size disparity affected its usefulness as a model for the US. Wickman 
granted this differential, but returned to a favored symbol, indicating the 
relatively even income distribution and democratic systems of both nations 
to underscore Sweden’s value as a source of lessons. Nicolin was more 
circumspect, suggesting that the Swedes’ “strong tradition of paternalism” 
was “conducive to cooperation” in a way not possible in the US. Reuther 
agreed with this conviction. However, the UAW president turned it into a 
criticism of the US’s preference for concentrating employment policy in 
the private sphere. Eventually, Wirtz asked the delegation if they expected 
future developments in American labor policy “to go in their direction, and, 
if so, do they expect such moves to come about through governmental or 
private action?” Wickman answered cautiously, speculating on a reconcili-
ation of American interest groups, similar to Sweden.71
Such predictions confirmed American labor-liberals’ belief in the need 
for a parity of influence and responsibilities between labor and manage-
ment. Greater control of economic steering, placed in a tripartite board that 
recognized employee representatives as equals of the employers, would be 
step towards such a reordering. To that end, Reuther kept up the rhetoric 
on Scandinavia, distributing favorable Toronto Star and OECD profiles on 
Swedish policy amongst the PACLMP members. As Weinberg commented 
upon forwarding the Toronto Star article to Reuther, Swedish policy had 
“enormous possibilities” for “a powerful labor movement.”72
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Transatlantic Exchanges and Lesson Drawing
The discussion of Swedish policy in the high-profile PACLMP was part 
of a larger process of transnational movement and communication in the 
early part of the 1960s that led historian Carl Marklund to proclaim it the, 
“high tide of American interest in Sweden.”73 Delegations from Sweden 
were frequent sights in Washington during that period. In October 1962, 
the directorate of the Swedish white-collar union funded their own trip to 
the US to share their “successful pattern” of unionism, the first interna-
tional trip taken by the entire directorate of a leading union.74 Moreover, 
the delegation of Geijer, Kugelberg, and Michanek was much in demand, 
visiting the Council of Economic Advisors, the Chamber of Commerce, 
members of the AFL-CIO, the President’s Commission on the Status of 
Women (PCSW), and UAW headquarters during their October 1962 tour.75 
Following their session with the PCSW, Esther Peterson, who had initiated 
the committee and herself lived in Sweden for four years, publicly declared 
her support for a federal “Five Year Plan” modeled after the 1960 Swed-
ish agreement between employers and unions to abolish gendered salary 
discriminations.76 The delegation returned to the US the following year to 
testify before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, on which 
Senator Douglas was chairman.
Outside of the invitations of the tripartite delegation, the deluge of Scan-
dinavian visits to the US might seem to signal a unidirectional interest ex-
tending from Europe to the US. On the contrary, influential American poli-
cymakers conducted their own tours of Scandinavia. Senator Joseph Clark 
travelled to Sweden, Denmark, and Romania in preparation of the report 
for his “Subcommittee on Housing for the Elderly” and came away im-
pressed with the “variety of accommodations and services.”77 Senator Mau-
rine Neuberger, chairman of the PCSW’s Committee on Social Insurance 
and Taxes, flew to Sweden in September 1962 to investigate legislation to 
improve equality for women, particularly regarding childcare centers for 
working women.78 So great was the demand for study tours of Scandinavia, 
73 Marklund, “A Swedish Norden,” 274–75.
74 Jorma L. Kaukonen to State Dept (A-301), 9 October 1962, NARA, RG84, Entry UD 3195, Box 159, 560.1.
75 Geijer also made a nationally broadcast speech in 1960. Marklund and Petersen, “Return to Sender,” 253.
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and particularly Sweden, that Reuther apologized to Geijer and assured his 
friend that it was not his intention “to turn the LO into a travel agency.”79
That Sweden became the primary Scandinavian destination for so many 
Americans is worth lingering over; after all, Scandinavian labor market 
policy existed in Denmark and Norway as well, and sometimes in forms 
more appealing to American progressives than in Sweden. Paul Douglas, 
for example, sought to draw industries into depressed areas rather than en-
courage labor mobility, a goal more aligned with policy in Denmark and 
Norway. Yet, his committees chose to study Sweden.80 Several explana-
tions may account for why Sweden dominated the American spotlight in the 
early 1960s. First, Swedish economic indicators in unemployment, produc-
tivity, and GDP were better than in Denmark or Norway, and the country’s 
larger population made it slightly more resilient to charges of small state 
exceptionalism. Second, starting in the 1930s, and especially after Sweden: 
The Middle Way, Americans had a history of treating Sweden as the best 
representative of a “Scandinavian model.” Third, previous scholars have 
noted Sweden’s public diplomacy strategy, including deploying branding 
and image circulation, which culminated in the 1960s with the Face of Swe-
den television show and the Meet Modern Sweden cultural tour throughout 
the American Midwest. By building a positive image of their nation, most 
notably through the well-funded American-Swedish News Exchange, Swe-
den “evolved into the archetypical welfare state” in the US’s reckoning.81 
Finally, the personal relationship of Reuther and Geijer gave the nation an 
influential advocate in the highest echelon of US politics and the backing 
of the UAW, a powerful labor organization that, during Kennedy’s elec-
tion, demonstrated its ability to enact political change.82 Although the UAW 
president maintained contacts with leaders in other countries, including 
Denmark and Norway, Reuther’s connections with Sweden represented an 
unmatched pipeline of news, ideas, ideology, and strategy.
However, it is not enough to record that Sweden came to the forefront of 
American interest, we must also judge what effect this elevation ultimately 
79 Walter Reuther to Arne Geijer, Apr 26, 1965, UAW President’s Office, Box 461, Folder 6, Reuther.
80 Levitan, Federal Aid, 240; Bernstein, Promises Kept, 167–72.
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had on American labor policy. Unfortunately, as Marklund and Klaus Peters-
en caution when following the transmission of Swedish policies, “it is diffi-
cult to evaluate their political impact,” especially since lessons from abroad 
may lose rhetorical orientation towards their native country during the poli-
cymaking process. Therefore, it is perhaps best to examine the eventual fate 
of the programs and arrangements that drew lessons from Scandinavia. The 
Goldberg-brokered contract in the steel industry collapsed disastrously in 
April 1962 when U.S. Steel refused to freeze its prices, leading Kennedy to 
lash out that, “My father always told me that all businessmen were sons of 
bitches, but I never believed it until now.” The double-cross, combined with 
subsequent negative press of the White House’s “ruthlessness” and an ac-
companying stock market breakdown, convinced the administration against 
further formal attempts to ensure that labor and management respected the 
public interest.83 Goldberg’s other project, the PACLMP, could not capi-
talize on a strong start and became “bogged down over both substantive 
and procedural matters,” leaving Goldberg (and Reuther) “to reconsider his 
dream of emulating the Swedish corporatist system.”84 The inability of its 
members to embody the necessary spirit of cooperation and communication 
ultimately doomed the commission, as rival camps set up around Reuther, 
Meany, and Ford president Henry Ford II.85 Although the PACLMP would 
not formally dissolve itself until 1969, its potential to reconstruct economic 
democracy in the US was dead long before. The PCSW, on the other hand, 
had more success, having both a specific task and a deadline to complete 
it. Their final report, entitled American Women, recommended childcare 
services for children from all economic levels, with costs scaled to parents’ 
ability to pay, outside contributions, and public appropriations.86 Further-
more, Sweden served as a direct example of how mothers and wives should 
possess property rights, an arrangement not guaranteed throughout the US. 
Nonetheless, there was no mention of Peterson’s five-year plan.
Even with the PCSW’s recommendations of some Swedish practices, 
the outcome of the transnational moment was generally disappointing for 
83 Lichtenstein, State of the Union, 135–36; Reeves, President Kennedy, 302–3; Stebenne, Arthur J. Gold-
berg, 298; Heath, John F. Kennedy, 83.
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labor-liberals. Instead of being recast in the image of Sweden, American 
labor relations and policy continued largely as before, with unemployment 
and inflation remaining significant concerns. 
Conclusion: The End of a Transnational Moment
Despite the ultimate failures to enact Scandinavian policies in the United 
States, the transnational moment of the early 1960s represented a major in-
cidence of lesson drawing, with Washington awash in Scandinavian experts 
and ideas. Yet, by the end of the decade, study tours from Scandinavia far 
outnumbered their companion tours from the US. The roots of this decline 
can be traced both domestically and internationally, as changes in political 
and labor leadership and discord over the Vietnam War calcified attitudes 
on both sides of the Atlantic.
In the US, Lyndon Johnson, taking over the presidency from the assassi-
nated Kennedy, proved less supportive of Swedish lessons. In one instance 
prior to the 1964 election, the president heard that his vice presidential 
candidate Hubert Humphrey was planning to attend a meeting of social 
democratic leaders in Harpsund, which Humphrey had previously attended 
in 1963 in the company of Reuther. Whereas Kennedy had given his bless-
ing to the tour and asked for reports from Humphrey and Reuther, John-
son allegedly proclaimed, “O my God! Not a socialist summit!” The next 
summer, Reuther travelled to Sweden alone.87 It is difficult to say whether 
Johnson truly believed that Sweden was socialist—after all he maintained 
a friendly relationship with Danish prime minister Jens Otto Krag88—or 
whether he was merely worried about such an attack from Republicans. 
Either way, the new president’s concern with the civil rights movement 
obviously far outweighed his interest in Scandinavian labor lessons, with 
the former dominating domestic discussion until the end of the decade. 
Reuther and the labor-liberals ended up spending much of their political 
and financial capital supporting civil rights, leaving little for other projects. 
Alongside the decline of the PACLMP and Goldberg’s nomination to the 
Supreme Court, these developments deprived Scandinavia of its political 
momentum.
Regardless, as Parsons’s comments about American visitors makes clear, 
87 Dickmeyer, Putting the World Together, 272-274.
88 Olesen, “Dilemmas,” 53.
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interest in Scandinavia persisted into 1965. However, international de-
velopments took their toll during the second half of the decade. For some 
Americans observing Sweden, “the system of collective bargaining…lost 
its magic in the torturous negotiations of 1966,” as the eventual contract ex-
panded wages and benefits beyond forecasts for productivity, subsequently 
inciting concerns about inflation.89 Simultaneously, a Swedish teachers’ 
strike demonstrated that industrial cooperation was not all encompassing.90 
Even more disastrous was the fallout from the Vietnam War. Besides creat-
ing a hostile diplomatic environment, high-level official travel between the 
US and Sweden waned amidst an atmosphere of political divergence. The 
communication that remained increasingly focused on the war’s develop-
ments, as Reuther found out when he attended the second Harpsund meet-
ing in 1965. Rather than a discussion about social democratic economic 
philosophy, the meeting produced a formal request by the European leaders 
that Reuther inform Johnson of their concerns about the war.91 Reuther de-
fended the US’s intervention in southeastern Asia at the meeting and during 
the early years of the war, but an increasingly critical stance during the lat-
ter-half of Johnson’s administration exacerbated tensions between him and 
the stolidly pro-war Meany. In 1968, Meany successfully parried a power-
grab by Reuther, resulting in the UAW permanently leaving the AFL-CIO. 
Thus, at the end of the decade, Reuther was no longer a dynamic national 
figure, but an embattled leader looking towards retirement.92 His death in 
a plane crash in 1970 robbed the Scandinavian industrial policies of their 
most staunch American proponent.
Scandinavian attitudes towards the United States were simultaneously 
eroding due to the Vietnam War, coinciding with and perhaps facilitating 
major shifts in political power. Connections with the United States be-
came a liability for political and economic leaders, as public opinion cas-
tigated them based on those connections. Amongst the most vocal critics 
were members of the anti-establishment youth movement, who accused the 
Scandinavian governments of having “abandoned their ideological com-
mitment to socialist reform” and being “content merely to manage capital-
89 Turner Cameron, Jr. to Dept of State, (Stockholm A-708), 17 May 1967, NARA, RG59, Entry A1 1613, Box 
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ism rather than to reform it.”93 This interlacing of distrust in US foreign af-
fairs with a rejection of the domestic status quo was apparent in 1968, when 
the streets of Stockholm resounded with demonstrators chanting “Tage och 
Geijer, Lyndons lakejer” [Tage and Geijer, Lyndon’s lackeys].94 Continued 
economic growth was no longer sufficient to justify the persistence of tra-
ditional cooperation and solidarity, as the Scandinavian Social Democratic 
parties were toppled one by one, until at last the Swedish Social Democrats 
lost control of the government in 1976 after 44 years in power. The result 
was a Scandinavian region that was less harmonious internally and exter-
nally, diminishing its usefulness as a model in American politics.
In accounting for the transnational moment’s demise, one must also con-
sider the role of over-saturation. As Scandinavian lessons became tied with 
labor-liberal goals in public debate, they came under attack by conservatives 
who accused the Scandinavian nations of being too small, too homogenous, 
and too socialist.95 Amongst them was Barry Goldwater, former Republi-
can candidate for president, who used an image of Sweden to condemn the 
unseen costs of the Democrats’ “pie-in-the-sky promises of socialism and 
of welfarism.”96 Warranted or otherwise, such charges chipped away at the 
effectiveness of Scandinavian lessons.
Even with its passing, the transnational moment represented an impor-
tant event in the history of American-Scandinavian relations. In it, Ameri-
can labor-liberals looked across the Atlantic to find a vision promising a 
reordering of American industrial relations, therein revealing the potential 
for immense policy diffusion over a short span of time. The American at-
tention to Sweden, which seemed to permeate throughout Washington from 
1961-1963, drew upon the space opened by Kennedy’s election to reimag-
ine the US’s political and economic landscape, as well as the convergence 
of American and Scandinavian concerns about wages, prices, and inflation. 
Furthermore, as the Cold War limited the choices for lesson drawing, Amer-
ican progressives found in Sweden an example of how economic democra-
cy could exist without sacrificing a system of free enterprise: “forethought” 
without “force.”97 Eventually, labor-liberals’ dependence on Scandinavian 
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lessons created a permanent partisan divide regarding the usage of images 
of Sweden.
Although both Reuther and Goldberg recognized the importance of long 
legacies in building a Swedish-style negotiative economy, the intoxicating 
spirit of renewal surrounding Kennedy’s election led the labor-liberals to 
overestimate the ability of the American economy and, in particular, the 
will of industrial actors to change. Had their attempts at restructuring the 
American economy around cooperative, centralized lines proved success-
ful, the early 1960s would have signified a major turning point in the wider 
expanse of American politics and society. However, such dreams were cru-
elly shattered by the necessity of political compromise and the intransigence 
of existing interests, both amongst employers and labor. Scandinavian les-
sons were unable to overcome existing brown field institutions within in-
dustrial relations and economic policy, and were largely abandoned at the 
modelling phase of the lesson drawing process. The incomplete results of 
the transnational moment seem to reinforce Rose’s warning about the in-
adequacy of drawing lessons from ideologically discordant systems. Yet, 
the assignment of ideological compatibility between Sweden and the US 
in the early 1960s was one of the labor-liberals’ most successful achieve-
ments. Given converging goals to the US, the Scandinavian lessons became 
powerful symbolic proxies for the ideals of the labor-liberals, who believed 
in the possibility of transnational transfer. Their commitment serves as a re-
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